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I. inlnwlurlioii. 138, —II. Ondinr uf AnowV model und ior;iilts, iS8. —Til.
I'uhlir gooils, i:i9.—IV. Ex|i<-!iilinii-c.s :iv pniihicfi! ronuuDilitics. 140. -V.
Ivxurnplf,^, 142. — VI Canclussoii, 144.
L IXTRODX;OTION
Professor Arrow has reecnily used a utilitarian model to study
the opiiiiial (liHtribution of public expcmliUire across a population
wliose nionibers dilTor in some respect. Let us call tliis fharaeteristic
'•ai)itity." ' A phuisible rase is made for the principle that expendi-
ture.'^ .should be higher for |)eo])!c with low ability, but not so high
as to iivorcume completely the inlicrent differences — higher ability
loads tn higlier utility at tiie social optimum. This situation is
called input-prDgressive, hut mitput-regressive.
In the field of (•(iucaiion. however, it ie olear that input regres-
Hivity — alioeating more rc^sources to the more able — is the current
practice, hi this note we etudy the cases in which some of the output
of the educational process is in the form of publk goods and in
which expenditures themselves are produeeU ooiiimodities. It is
shown that either nf fhese possibilities weakens the case for input
|;rogressivity. In Arrow's model goods were private, and the level
of ex{)eni!iture was exogenous.
Throvigli several examples we then discuss the dependence of
tiie degree of progressivity on the level of the budget for public
expenditures and on the efficiency of production.
O. OuTLiNK OF ARROW'S MODEL AND
The model considers a population of individuals with ability
j; varying among them. Let the density of individuals of type x in
the potmlaiion be nix}. The problem is tn distribute expenditures
*This work Wius supported hy NfUional .Science Founiktion Grant GS-
2H7A-M !if Ilie Insljiiite for Matiicniatira! Studies in the Social ycieni-ea at
sSlanfonI fnivci-.-sity aniJ by NaUunal Srif^nce Foundation Grant GS-316S8 at
H;ir\ani University. We would like to timnk Ki^nneth Arrow and liobert
Wilson for liel])fu! cornmenL>?.
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Public Exiienditurp.s," thiH Journal, LXXXV (Aug. 1971), 409-15.n-:s:^iv!TY OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 1.39
y across individuals t^uch that the sum of utilities is maximized.
Utility dciiond.s on ahility and expenditures: u-u{x,y).
Fornuilly, we nm;>i CIKKISC a function yix) to maximize
subject to ihe eonsiraint on total
J,!/(.r'in(.Tiri.r--.i^/.
Arrow e^how.s thai the optimal policy can be cliaracterized by
the
Since ttyy<i) in needed to insure the, second-oviier eondiiiuns, we
have the re.sult that input progressivity ——<0 holds if M.ry<0.
Thin i^ i-i|uivaSeiit to the fact that higlser ability individuals benefit
Un utility) ie^^w from an extra dollar (if oxjienditiires. In tho case
in whicli uiiiity depends on an olijeetively mea^surahle output
z\x,tj[.r:}) unly (ami nut explicitly on .c). Arrow shows that- the
u]il,iT!i;il poliey is niort' priigre.^sive as u is more concave, relative to
the eoncavify of z. A jiartiniiarly neat, form of this result is ob-
tained f<ir the ease in whieh z can he written iiiiplieitly as
H{z) -.•~F{x)-\-i:{y),
in whieh ea.se the nptinial poliey i^ input-rc^resyive (jirogreftsive)
... { H' \ . .
iS r—^. 1 IS inereaHUij^ (decreasing 1 lu ^. Tiuis, if u is ver>'concave,
indicatin^i; a sneial preference for e(pity of distribuiifivi in contrast
to etfieii^'ncy of prnduetion, then iiij)ui proj^ressivity should he the
rule.
f [I. PiiiLic GOODS
We vonsiiler vhft eaf-e of an ubjectively measurable output
z{x,ij\ for eaeh irHiividiiai. Tlie utility funetion, however, has three
arguments, the thinl being Uie aggregate amount of tlie objectively
iiioasi^rable output in the efunuiny.
Define tliis agj^regiite as
/(//(. I I ^ jz{x,y[x))n[x)dx.
We write u - u (x.y.Z) and denote partial differentiation of u by sub-
j-crijits t_, 2, ami 3 for J, y, ami Z, respectively.
v\t an opf-iniuni ihe marginal r;ocial value of one dollar of ex-
penditures on any individual is equal to that on any other indi-
viiiual.140 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS




a quantity that is positive whenever aggregate output is a social
good.
The denominator of the expression (*) is negative by the
second-order conditions. Thus, we shall tend to have input progres-
sivity if Wi2<0 and Uz is small, and input regressivity if IH is large
or Zxy is large. That is, as one might expect, that as the positive
externalities from having a highly productive population in the ag-
gregate become important, public expenditures should be shifted
to those individuals whose ability enables them to use it more effi-
ciently. Similarly, as ability and expenditure become more comple-
mentary, greater advantage should be taken of this fact by increas-
ing the regressivity of the policy.
To find the actual optimal policy, one solves the differential
equation (*) using the budget equation.
as an initial condition.
IV. EXPENDITURES AS PRODUCED COMMODITIES
In the above model the allocation of expenditures to one person
affects someone else through a pure public good. The discussion
can alternatively be recast in terms of an appropriable output that
can be reallocated either for direct consumption or for use as an
input. One situation in which this occurs naturally is that in which
some of the output of a sector is also produced by that sector. Thus
raising the level of inputs results in some saving, since outputs
available also increase. Education (which produces teachers, in
part) is an example of such a sector.
The model we construct has the sector in question producing
an objectively measurable net output, or surplus, Z. Individuals'
utilities depend on the expenditures allocated to them y [x) and on
their share of the surplus w{x). Both y{x) and w[x) are objects
of choice, the constraint being that aggregate surplus distributed
be at most equal to aggregate production, and given the total ex-
penditures on inputs. Formally, the problem isPROGRESSIVITY OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 141
maximize ju{w{x),y(x))n{x)dx
subject to fw{x)n(x)dx^jz{x,y (x) )n{x)dx
and j'y (x) n {x) dx^M.




where q and p are Lagrange multipliers. Upon differentiating these
conditions, we find that the optimal policy can be characterized by
and
dw ( Uy^ \ dy
Hence, since the coefficient of -p- in the first condition is nega-
dx
tive by the second-order conditions and the positivity ^ of q, the
optimal input policy is progressive (regressive) if ability and direct
expenditure are substitutes (complements) in production.
From the second condition it is seen that, if Wyu,<0, then -;—
dx
du
has the opposite sign of --^—, i.e., the optimal surplus distribution
policy is progressive (regressive) when the optimal input policy is




If direct expenditure and surplus distribution are both regres-
sive (progressive), then the optimal output policy is also regressive
(progressive). If direct expenditure is regressive but surplus dis-
tribution is progressive, output progressivity can go in either direc-
tion, depending on the utility function.
Appropriability of output could be restricted solely to input
use with the same conclusions. This problem has the form,
2. Multiplying the above condition by yn{x)dx and integrating, we find
that
Su,yn{x)dx = qf{z — z,y)u(x)dx.
On the right-hand side each of the terms z — z,y is positive by the concavity
of z. Since the left-hand side is positive, we see that 9>0. Note that the
above solution yields a direct interpretation of g as the shadow price of expen-
ditures.142 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
maximize j'u(x,y{x))n(x)dx
subject to fy{x)n{x)dx^^z{x,y {x))n{x)dx.
From the first-order condition one obtains
dy
Since the term in parentheses on the left-hand side is negative,
the sign of —^ depends, as previously, on the signs of u^y and z^y
with the appropriate interpretation.
The similarity of the results in this and in the previous section
is not surprising, since an appropriable output with fixed allocation
rules can be described as a pure public good.
V. EXAMPLES
The previous sections have shown that there may be some case
for input regressivity when the expenditure produces public goods
or when expenditures are constrained by aggregate output that
in turn depends on ability. Here we present some comparative
static calculations that further strengthen the case for input regres-
sivity. In particular, we study the response of the optimal policy to
changes in the budget constraint and the technological productivity
of expenditures. In all instances, higher levels of expenditure or
higher productivity lead to more regressive policies.
Example 1: Public Goods — Changes in Budget. In the frame-
work of Section III let us, for simplicity, specialize to the case in
which utility depends only on the output of the public good Z and
in which production is Cobb-Douglas, z(x,y)=x'^y'^-''. One can
show that
dM UlU • Hyy
Since Zy{x,y(x,M)) is a constant over x, say, q{M), we have that
dy _ dq
""dM dM
Integrating over x, we obtain
dv / , , dq . 1 , \ ,
(—r=-n ix)dx- -^hS "i^ (^) "^ >
dAf dM Zyy
and the left-hand side is 1, by the budget constraint. Since Zyy<0,PROGRESSIVITY OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 143
we have -7TF<0. Hence, since q is independent of x, —^>0 for am (i]\^
alia;.
By the first equation of this section the optimal policy becomes
more input-regressive as expenditures increase if the term in paren-
theses is negative. That this is the case for Cobb-Douglas production
functions can be verified directly.
Example 2: Private Goods {Arrow's case of objectively measur-
able outputs) — Change in Budget. For contrast, we consider the
case in which u = u(z(x,y)), which may be thought of as the pure
private goods case as opposed to the pure public goods case treated




{U'u"'-2u") (l-a)z2+ [u'+zu") {auY-").
The term (wV"-2w") is positive (negative) if the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion is decreasing (increasing). The term {u'+zu")
has the same sign as one minus the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion. Since decreasing absolute risk aversion is thought to be the
intuitively " appealing case, there is a bias in the direction of in-
creasing input regressivity, even in Arrow's model, as the budget
is expanded.
Example 3: Public Goods — Changes in Productivity. Suppose
that the productivity of expenditures is parameterized by A accord-
ing to 2 = x«(Ai/)i-'' and that U=U{Z). One can show that
dx
is proportional to
3. See K. J. Arrow, Aspects oj the Theory oj Risk Bearing (Helsinki-
Academic Bookstore, 1965). Arguments for using the von-Neumann-Morgen-
stern utility function in utilitarian social choice theory can be found in W S
Vickrey, "Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules," this Journal LXXIV
(Nov. 1960) 507-35; and J. C. Harsanyi, "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic
Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal oj Political Econ-
omy LXIII (Aug. 1955), 309-21. (Both works are reprinted in Readings in
Weljare Economics, K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky, eds. (Homewood 111 • R
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which is positive in the Cobb-Douglas case. Thus, increasing input
regressivity should be practiced as the productivity of public ex-
penditures increases (in this particular parametric form).
Example 4: Produced Expenditures — Changes in Budget. In
the framework of Section IV assume that the budget is partly pro-
duced and in part given exogenously. The budget constraint thus
takes the form
jy(x)n(x)dx = M+jz(x,y)n(x)dx,
where M is the exogenously given level of resources minus the ag-
gregate surplus to be distributed. For the additive utility case,
u(wy)=f(w)g(y), it is easily shown that, for the optimal policy





is positive for all x.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the progressivity of public expenditures cannot
be determined by such simple utilitarian criteria. However, our
analysis (as well as Arrow's) brings out some considerations that
should enter into practical decision making. We have shown that
there may be economic forces working towards regressivity as well
as towards progressivity of expenditures.
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